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Situational strengtha b s t r a c t
Across different experiments we show that individual differences in Honesty-Humility predict exploita-
tion in economic games, and that this relation is moderated by situational power. Power was manipu-
lated by comparing games in which allocators either had absolute power (dictator game), intermediate
(delta game), or shared power (ultimatum game) over joint outcomes. We developed the power-
exploitation affordances hypothesis that predicts that allocators with lower Honesty-Humility act more
exploitative when they have absolute power than when their power is intermediate or shared.
Additionally, we also tested these predictions for the actual earnings in these games. The results were
generally supportive of our main hypotheses. Our findings contribute to understanding situational and
personality effects on how individuals behave in positions of power (e.g., leaders).
 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Exploitative and selfish behaviors of people in power may be
among the most damaging risks that organizations face. Corrup-
tion, fraud, and abuse of authority may result in direct costs for
organizations and their employees. Additionally, when uncovered,
such acts can result in highly publicized scandals which may incur
reputational damage for the organization (e.g., Enron, Orange).
Although exploitative behaviors can manifest themselves at all
organizational levels, they are especially harmful if they involve
people in high power positions (such as leaders) because of their
disproportionate influence on organizational culture and
decision-making (Padilla, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2007).Scholars have suggested two main causes of exploitation by
people in power positions, that is, situational and personality
determinants. According to the situational perspective, structural
differences in access to power directly increases exploitation of
others by people in power positions (Kipnis, 1972; Ludwig &
Longenecker, 1993). According to the personality perspective, indi-
vidual differences in personality, such as variation in the trait
Honesty-Humility, may be an important predictor of the willing-
ness to exploit others (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Hilbig & Zettler,
2009). These two causes jointly influence behavior because person-
ality expresses itself in situations and therefore the two may inter-
act to affect behavior (e.g., Funder, 2006). The main hypothesis that
we test in this research is that power asymmetry will exacerbate
the exploitative tendencies of people in high power positions espe-
cially among those who are low on Honesty-Humility.
This core hypothesis is conceptually derived from the recently
developed Situation-Trait-Outcome-Activation model (STOA; De
Vries, Tybur, Pollet, & Van Vugt, 2016), which systematically maps
the situational affordances that allow personality differences to
affect behavior. The situational affordances perspective from the
STOA model allows us to make specific and unique predictions
on the joint impact of the situation (i.e., power asymmetry) and
personality (i.e., Honesty-Humility) on exploitative behaviors of
individuals with situational power and on the outcomes of their
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power asymmetry and personality on decision-making and then
develop our power-exploitation affordances hypothesis.
1.1. Power asymmetry leads to exploitation
Power is defined as having asymmetric control over valued
resources in a social relationship (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Van
Vugt & Tybur, 2015). Through asymmetric control over valued
resources, power asymmetry affords the exploitation of low power
individuals by allowing persons in positions of power to allocate
more resources to themselves or take resources away from others
lower in the hierarchy. Multiple studies have shown that power
asymmetry leads to exploitative behavior. For instance, giving indi-
viduals power increases the tendency to falsely incriminate some-
one for financial gain (Swanner & Beike, 2015), to make risky
investments with the resources of others (Pitesa & Thau, 2013),
and to take personal credit for collective accomplishments
(Lammers & Burgmer, 2018).
Various theories explain why power asymmetries give rise to
exploitative behaviors. The social distance theory of power
(Magee & Smith, 2013) states that power increases feelings of
social distance, resulting in a reduced interest in others’ thoughts
and feelings, less responsiveness to the needs of others, and more
disengaging emotions. Similarly, the approach-inhibition theory of
power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) states that power
causes individuals to focus and act on their personal goals, and
to construe other people as a means to an end. The Bathsheba syn-
drome (Ludwig & Longenecker, 1993) is aligned with these per-
spectives as it argues that individuals in a power position are
more confident that their exploitative acts will not be found out.
Finally, evolutionary theories of power suggest that steep organi-
zational hierarchies—in which there are substantial differences in
power between leaders and followers—give rise to more dominant,
exploitative forms of leadership (Van Vugt & Ronay, 2014). Overall,
these various theories suggest that having power increases both
individuals’ motivation and opportunity to exploit others for their
own benefit.
1.2. Honesty-Humility and exploitation
In terms of personality differences, the Honesty-Humility trait of
the HEXACO framework may be the most important trait predictor
of exploitative tendencies, and it may in turn determine in what
kinds of positions people are most likely to exploit others. The
Honesty-Humility factor, which subsumes characteristics such as
fairness, modesty, and honesty (Ashton et al., 2004; Lee & Ashton,
2004), is based on the very same lexical approach that has led to
the Big Five personality consensus in the early nineties of the pre-
vious century (Goldberg, 1982, 1990). The lexical hypothesis states
that all the important personality characteristics are encoded in
language, and that characteristics that co-occur can be derived from
that language in the form of personality traits. The HEXACO frame-
work, and thus the Honesty-Humility trait, is the result of this lex-
ical approach, and studies from various languages and cultures
have found that these six factors constitute the maximum set of
cross-culturally replicable factors of personality (Ashton et al.,
2004; Saucier, 2009; see for a review Ashton, Lee, & De Vries, 2014).
The HEXACO framework is an acronym of the six personality
traits that it encapsulates: Honesty-Humility (H), Emotionality
(E), eXtraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C),
and Openness to Experience (O). The Extraversion, Conscientious-
ness, and Openness to Experience traits largely overlap with the
more widely known Big Five or five factor model (FFM) of person-
ality (Digman, 1990). However, there are some differences
between the two personality models. First, the HEXACO modelposits the existence of a sixth personality trait in Honesty-
Humility which captures content related to honesty and modesty
that is not well captured by the FFM. Second, two factors in the
HEXACO model have an alternative (rotated) position in personal-
ity space. Specifically, anger-related adjectives that tend to load on
Neuroticism in the FFM load on the Agreeableness factor in the
HEXACO model and sentimentality-related adjectives that tend
to load on Agreeableness in the FFM load on the Emotionality fac-
tor in the HEXACO model (see Ashton & Lee, 2007; Ashton et al.,
2014 for in-depth descriptions of the differences between the
two personality models).
The trait Honesty-Humility is associated with a range of differ-
ent behaviors and outcomes that are conceptually related to
exploitative behaviors. For instance, Honesty-Humility is nega-
tively related to counterproductive and delinquent work behaviors
(De Vries & Van Gelder, 2015; Lee, Ashton, & De Vries, 2005) and
unethical business decisions (Ashton & Lee, 2008; De Vries,
Pathak, Van Gelder, & Singh, 2017). Moreover, leaders’ self-rated
Honesty-Humility has been found to be negatively related to fol-
lowers’ ratings of abusive leadership (Breevaart & De Vries,
2017). Additionally, Honesty-Humility is positively related to fac-
tors that theoretically protect individuals from exploitation, such
as ethical leadership (De Vries, 2012). Thus, there are good reasons
to assume that Honesty-Humility is an important predictor of
exploitative behavior.1.3. The power-exploitation affordances hypothesis
The power-exploitation affordances hypothesis offers a possible
explanation for how personality and situational power differences
interact in shaping individuals’ exploitative behaviors. The
Situation-Trait-Outcome-Activation model (STOA; De Vries et al.,
2016) posits that evolutionarily-relevant situations have distinct
affordances that allow for the expression of particular personality
traits and that activating these traits in such situations will have
multiple downstream consequences. More precisely, the STOA
model argues that these situational affordances contribute to per-
sonality variation due to three different processes: situation activa-
tion, trait activation, and outcome activation.
First, situation activation means that individuals are more likely
to seek out situations that fit their personality. For example, extra-
verted people are more likely to (want to) attend parties with lots
of strangers than introverted people. Second, trait activation means
that the trait is more likely to be expressed in situations that con-
tain cues that are diagnostic of the trait. For instance, at a party
with strangers, individual differences in extraversion are more
likely to be shown—and thus observed by others—than say individ-
ual differences in conscientiousness. Third, outcome activation
means that different outcomes, positive and/or negative, emerge
as a consequence of the expression of high or low levels of an acti-
vated personality trait. To continue with our example, extraverted
people are more likely to make friends at parties with many stran-
gers and will find such parties more enjoyable.
Relevant to our paper, STOA also makes specific predictions
about situational affordances for people who differ dispositionally
in Honesty-Humility. Specifically, individuals low in Honesty-
Humility are more likely to seek out positions of power (Lee
et al., 2013). Moreover, individual differences in Honesty-
Humility are most likely activated in situations in which there is
a possibility to exploit others (De Vries et al., 2016), and should
therefore be more pronounced in situations in which a person
has high situational power. In addition, such situations likely affect
the outcomes of people low and high in Honesty-Humility differ-
ently, with those low on Honesty-Humility more likely to obtain
better outcomes in a situation in which they have more power.
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Honesty-Humility on exploitation because people in powerful posi-
tions have few behavioral constraints (De Vries, 2018; Galinsky,
Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Therefore, power-
ful persons can shape situations to make them more aligned with
their dominant trait (cf., Keltner et al., 2003). Furthermore, individ-
uals in powerful positions may be relatively frequently exposed to
situations in which they can exploit others, because they often have
to make decisions involving the distribution of scarce resources.
Consequently, Honesty-Humility is more strongly activated when
a person has high power (i.e., power increases trait activation of
Honesty-Humility). Finally, having power gives people with low
Honesty-Humility a chance to increase their exploitative behavior
without the risk of punishment, retaliation, or ostracism (i.e., power
increases outcome activation).
Trait expression in situations is also determined also by situa-
tional strength (Cooper & Withey, 2009; Funder, 2006). It has been
proposed that in strong situations traits have little influence
because behavior is mainly governed by the situation itself. Com-
paratively, a weak situation may activate a trait and then the indi-
vidual dispositions matter more because the situation itself
provides little input in how to behave. Power is also considered
to be variation in situational strength (Cooper & Withey, 2009)
and has been demonstrated to influence the expression of person-
ality traits (Galinsky et al., 2008; Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012).
Specifically, individuals in a position of high power have fewer
constraints and are therefore more in a weak situation than indi-
viduals with less power who are more in a strong situation. There-
fore, we predict that Honesty-Humility will be most often
activated in a situation of high power.
An alternative model for understanding interactions between
personality and situation is the Traits as Situational Sensitivities
model (TASS; Marshall & Brown, 2006). This model makes a some-
what different prediction than the STOAmodel regarding the inter-
action between situational power and Honesty-Humility.
Specifically, this model argues that the greatest trait expression
is observed in situations with intermediate strength rather than
in either weak or strong situations. The TASS predicts that in inter-
mediate (neither weak, nor strong) situations there is sufficient
activation for those who are at one end of the trait distribution
(e.g., low Honesty-Humility) and insufficient activation for those
who are at the other end of the distribution (e.g., high Honesty-
Humility). Comparatively, the TASS argues that in weak situations
(e.g., absolute power situation) there is less activation of the trait
than in the intermediate strength situation. Therefore, the TASS
predicts that the intermediate situation is best able to distinguish
between people who are either high or low on a trait. The STOA
and the TASS model both predict that in the strong situation
(e.g., shared power) there is least trait activation.2 Thus, by includ-
ing situations that vary in situational power, from absolute (weak
situation) to intermediate to shared power (strong situation), we
are able to contrast predictions from the STOA and the TASS-models.
1.4. Power and exploitation in games
In order to test the power-exploitation affordances hypothesis,
we used economic games to model exploitative decisions (e.g., De
Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Stouten, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2005).32 We thank the editor for bringing the TASS model to our attention. For the sake of
clarity, we did not have a-priori predictions to contrast this prediction to the one from
the STOA model. However, our data allowed us to compare these two contrasting
predictions.
3 From an economist’s perspective, any transaction higher than zero is considered
prosocial because it violates the economic rationale; from a psychologist’s perspec-
tive, other considerations such as fairness determine whether an act is prosocial or
exploitative.Each game represents a unique situation that appeals to a different
set of motives and varies in levels of conflict, but all games have in
common that they revolve around choosing to either act in a self-
interested way or to forgo self-interest and foster the welfare of
others (Thielmann, Böhm, & Hilbig, 2015). This trade-off lies at the
heart of most exploitative behaviors. An additional reason to model
exploitative behavior with economic games lies in their external
validity in predicting moral decisions. For instance, behavior in eco-
nomic games has been found to predict whether or not people repay
their loans (Karlan, 2005), do volunteer work (McClintock & Allison,
1989), donate to charities (Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt,
2007), and return money that they are not entitled to (Franzen &
Pointner, 2013).
An additional advantage of using economic games is that power
can also be easily manipulated within these games (Sivanathan,
Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2008). The power symmetry or asymmetry
between players is one of the crucial elements that differ between
games (Gerpott, Balliet, Columbus, Molho, & De Vries, 2018; Kelley
et al., 2003). Relevant to our paper, dictator and ultimatum games
differ in the level of power of the allocator (Galinsky, Rucker, &
Magee, 2015; Suleiman, 1996). In the ultimatum game, the alloca-
tor divides resources between him-/herself and a recipient
(Forsynthe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Güth, Schmittberger,
& Schwartze, 1982). The recipient then decides whether to accept
or reject the offer. If accepted, the resources will be divided as pro-
posed; if rejected, both get nothing. In the dictator game, the allo-
cator also divides resources but, in this game, the recipient has no
say in the proposed division (Forsynthe et al., 1994).
The ultimatum game and the dictator game lie on a continuum
of power (Galinsky et al., 2015; Suleiman, 1996). Suleiman sug-
gested that changing the effect of veto power (the delta factor)
turns a dictator game in an ultimatum game by changing the per-
centage of what both the allocator and recipient receive when an
offer is rejected. In the dictator game, this value is set at 100%
and in the ultimatum game this value is set at 0%. Versions that
are mixes of these two games can also be construed, so-called delta
games (i.e., when the value is set somewhere between the two
extremes). Several studies have utilized this continuum as a
manipulation of power (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, &
De Dreu, 2008; Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004). In this
research we include a version of the delta game (in Study 2), thus
testing an intermediate level of power (Suleiman, 1996). The inclu-
sion of the delta game as an intermediate form of power has sev-
eral advantages when compared to only contrasting the dictator
and ultimatum game.
First, power is mainly conceptualized and operationalized as a
dichotomous variable (i.e., having versus lacking power; Anicich
& Hirsh, 2017). However, as Anicich and Hirsh argue, it is more
appropriate to consider power as a continuous variable. By com-
paring allocator decisions in the ultimatum game, delta game,
and the dictator game we are able to examine the influence of sit-
uational power at shared, intermediate, and absolute power levels.
Furthermore, the ultimatum game and dictator game have been
considered to differ in situational strength (Zhao & Smillie, 2015).
Specifically, the dictator game is a weak situation without any
external constraints, whereas the ultimatum game is strong situa-
tion where most people act alike. Finally, including the delta game
also enables us to compare predictions from the STOA and TASS
models. We will refer to the dictator game, delta game, and the
ultimatum games as situations of absolute, intermediate, and
shared power respectively. These situations also vary in situational
strength; the absolute power condition is a weak situation, the
intermediate power condition a medium situation, and the shared
power condition a strong situation. Comparing decisions in these
three games are informative for understanding how various levels
of power affect the expression of Honesty-Humility.
4 Note that G*Power only allows for the calculation of a repeated measures ANOVA
(not a repeated measures ANCOVA). However, if we conducted an a-priori power
analysis using a repeated measures ANOVA with two groups (instead of a covariate),
two within subject measurements (levels of power), and the expected effect size of
gp2 = 0.04, a sample size of 194 participants was required to detect an interaction
effect with a = 0.05 and b = 0.80.
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Three prior studies have investigated whether power moderates
the relations between individual dispositions and exploitation
modeled in economic games. However, none of these studies oper-
ationalized power in a more continuous way. Furthermore, these
studies yielded some conflicting findings. A study by Bendahan,
Zehnder, Pralong, and Antonakis (2015) investigated the interac-
tion between power and Honesty-Humility and found only evi-
dence for a main effect of power on exploitation. A study by
DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, and Ceranic (2012) investigated the
interaction between power and moral identity internalization (a
trait conceptually related to both Honesty-Humility and Agreeable-
ness) and found evidence for both a main effect of power on
exploitation and an interaction effect. More specifically, individuals
low in moral identity who recalled an episode of power became
more exploitative, whereas individuals high in moral identity
who recalled power became more generous. Finally, a study by
Hilbig and Zettler (2009) found an interaction between power
and Honesty-Humility such that this trait was negatively related
to exploitation in the dictator game with also a (non-significant)
negative relation between Honesty-Humility and exploitation for
the ultimatum game.
The above studies had different kinds of manipulations of
power, making comparisons between them somewhat difficult.
Specifically, Bendahan et al. (2015) manipulated power by con-
trasting various dictator games that differed in the amount of
response options and the number of people affected by the dicta-
tor’s behavior. However, these manipulations only contrasted vari-
ations in absolute power. In contrast to this study, DeCelles et al.
(2012) manipulated power external to economic games by letting
participants recall an episode of their life in which they had power
and the control group recalled what they had done the previous
day. However, this power recall approach has been criticized
because it is potentially subject to a demand effect and may reflect
the psychological effects of feeling powerful rather than the actual
power in a situation (Flynn, Gruenfeld, Molm, & Polzer, 2011;
Sturm & Antonakis, 2015).
Finally, Hilbig and Zettler (2009) manipulated power by con-
trasting the ultimatum game and the dictator game in the same
way that we aimed to do in the current studies. However, our study
carried various design improvements. First, we planned to check
whether these games actually differ in the amount of power that
participants experience when playing these games (such measures
were missing in the Hilbig and Zettler (2009)-study). Furthermore,
unlike their research we added an intermediate power condition to
look at the expressions of Honesty-Humility across three different
power conditions. Finally, we employed incentivized multi-player
games—instead of hypothetical games—with real, tangible mone-
tary outcomes.
1.6. Overview of our studies
Building on the above studies, our goal is to test the power-
exploitation affordances hypothesis in terms of trait activation
and outcome activation. We test this hypothesis by contrasting
three games in which allocators either have absolute power (the
dictator game), intermediate power (delta game), or shared power
(the ultimatum game) over the division of resources. Based on the
power-exploitation affordances hypothesis, we predict an interac-
tion between situational power and the Honesty-Humility trait on
exploitative behavior in economic games (i.e., power increases trait
activation of Honesty-Humility). We expect that having power
results in an activation of individual differences in Honesty-
Humility such that those low in Honesty-Humility will take more
when they have absolute power. In contrast, we expect individualshigh in Honesty-Humility not to be influenced by the power
manipulation to the same extent as individuals low in Honesty-
Humility. We will also compare these predictions with those
derived from the TASS model (Marshall & Brown, 2006). The TASS
model argues that in the intermediate power situation the individ-
ual differences in Honesty-Humility will be more strongly related
to exploitation than in a situation where someone has absolute
power. Furthermore, both the TASS and the STOA model predict
that in the shared power condition (i.e., strong situation) the rela-
tion between Honesty-Humility and exploitation is the weakest
compared to the other power conditions. Finally, we expect that
individuals low in Honesty-Humility will benefit more from their
power than individuals high in Honesty-Humility (i.e., power
increases outcome activation of Honesty-Humility).
We investigate our predictions in two experiments (and a pilot
study). Study 1 investigates the contrast between the ultimatum
and dictator games to demonstrate that Honesty-Humility is associ-
ated with exploitative behaviors in the absolute power condition
only (consistent with the STOA model). Subsequently, a pilot study
investigates whether allocators have different perceptions of their
power in the ultimatum game, dictator game, and the intermediate
delta game. Finally, in Study 2we use these three games in an incen-
tivized multi-player interaction experiment to investigate interac-
tions between Honesty-Humility and situational power. In Study
2, we will test the predictions from the TASS and the STOA model.2. Study 1
This first study is a replication of Hilbig and Zettler (2009) and
tested the power-exploitation affordances hypothesis by collecting
data on individual differences in Honesty-Humility and investigat-
ing their expression in two games that differed in the balance of
power: the ultimatum game and dictator game. We expected to
replicate Hilbig and Zettler that Honesty-Humility would interact
with power. Apart from this main hypothesis, we also investigated
trait activation of Honesty-Humility across a battery of 9 additional
economic games using a between-subjects primed power task
(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Because of the inconsistent
findings, we discontinued this line of research (see supplementary
files for the full materials and results) and focused on the ultima-
tum game and the dictator game (collapsed across priming condi-
tions) instead because these two games figure prominently in
models of exploitation and because they differ inherently in the
amount of allocator power (Galinsky et al., 2015; Suleiman, 1996).
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
To obtain an estimate of the sample size needed, a power anal-
ysis was conducted using GPower 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). Our expected effect size was based on the findings
of Hilbig and Zettler (2009). Specifically, we took the obtained cor-
relation between Honesty-Humility and the difference score
between the ultimatum game and dictator game as input (i.e.,
r = 0.20; a = 0.05; b = 0.80; one-tailed test). To test our main
hypothesis we minimally required a sample of 150 participants.
Note that we based the power calculation upon the correlation
effect size because we are not aware of any software that enables
us to calculate a power analysis for a repeated measures ANCOVA.4
7 After all economic games were completed, several data-quality check items were
administered. These included self-reported seriousness and two questions enquiring
about how well the participants could imagine the interactions. As a robustness
check, we also analyzed our data without 10 participants who scored two standard
deviations or lower than the mean score of the data-quality check items because
these quality checks were significantly correlated to exploitation in the ultimatum
game. However, these data-quality check questions do not have an absolute cutoff
criterion and we therefore report the findings from the full dataset. Excluding these
10 participants did not change our results. Additionally, a comprehension check for
the Prisoner’s Dilemma was included at the end of the experiment but we did not use
the answers as an exclusion criterion because they did not relate to the economic
games of focal interest (see the supplementary files for further details).
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participant was removed because of a noncompliant response pat-
tern (see Materials for the procedure used to detect noncompliant
patterns).5 The final sample of 209 participants (Mage = 24.54 years,
SDage = 11.42 years; 151 women) consisted mostly of students par-
ticipating for course credits (67.5%) supplemented with a conve-
nience sample, who did not receive payment for participation
(32.5%). The convenience sample was recruited by four psychology
students who helped with the project as part of their undergraduate
bachelor thesis. These students approached people in their own per-
sonal network (e.g., friends, family) to participate in the study. A sen-
sitivity analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007)
demonstrated that we would be able to detect an effect of r = 0.17
(at a = 0.05 and b = 0.80, one-tailed test) with this sample size.
2.1.2. Materials
2.1.2.1. HEXACO-100. The Dutch HEXACO-100 (De Vries, Ashton, &
Lee, 2009) consists of sixteen items for each of the six personality
dimensions plus four items to measure the interstitial Altruism
facet. Respondents provided self-ratings on a five-point Likert-
scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). To check for data
quality, noncompliant response patterns were identified with the
procedure described in Lee and Ashton (2018; see Barends & De
Vries, 2019 for a demonstration of the effectiveness of the proce-
dure in removing noncompliant responses). All scales had a relia-
bilities above 0.80.
2.1.2.2. Dictator game (allocator role). The allocator divided an ini-
tial endowment of €100.- between oneself and a hypothetical
recipient. The allocator was told that the hypothetical recipient
had no influence on the outcome whatsoever. For ease of interpre-
tation the amount kept by the dictator was taken as an indication
of exploitative behavior. Note, however, that participants were
asked how much money they wanted to offer to the recipient
instead of how much they wanted to keep.
2.1.2.3. Ultimatum game (allocator role). The ultimatum game was
similar to the dictator game; the allocator divided an initial
endowment of €100.- between oneself and a hypothetical recipi-
ent. The difference between the games was that the hypothetical
recipient could either accept or reject the offer as proposed by
the allocator. If the offer was accepted, the money was divided as
proposed; if the offer was rejected, both the allocator and the
recipient got nothing. Again, the amount kept was taken as the out-
come measure.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants first completed the Dutch 100-item HEXACO per-
sonality inventory (De Vries et al., 2009). Subsequently, partici-
pants played eleven economic games, the dictator game
(allocator role), the ultimatum game (allocator and recipient roles),
the trust game (trustor and trustee roles), chicken, tragedy of the
commons, public goods game (two versions), and the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma (two versions).6 The eleven games were divided
into two blocks to ensure that two roles or versions of the same5 Note that this was a post-hoc exclusion conducted after the data of Study 1 had
already been analyzed. However, we have reported the results with this exclusion in
order to keep the exclusions comparable with Study 2 where these exclusions were
conducted before analyzing the data. The results of both Studies 1 and 2 were
comparable with or without these exclusions.
6 Detailed methods and results for these additional economic games can be found
in the supplemental materials. Note that we did not investigate how Honesty-
Humility influenced recipient reactions in the ultimatum game because such
reactions reflect reactive cooperation and are related to Agreeableness and not to
Honesty-Humility (Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013; Thielmann, Hilbig, &
Niedtfeld, 2014).game would not follow each other. The order of the two blocks
was randomized as was the order of games within blocks. The games
were all hypothetical, meaning that the other player(s) and the
financial consequences had to be imagined. The economic games
were described in as neutral terms as possible (e.g., as a task instead
of a game, following Zhao, Ferguson, & Smillie, 2017).72.2. Results
Note that all results are available via the Open Science Frame-
work (http://alturl.com/7tskd).
We first determined whether Honesty-Humility was a signifi-
cant predictor of behavior in the two economic games. Table 1
shows that only exploitation in the dictator game was significantly
related to Honesty-Humility (r = 0.27, p < .001), whereas
exploitation in the ultimatum game was not significantly related
to Honesty-Humility (r = 0.13, p = .063).
To investigate the power-exploitation affordances hypothesis, a
mixed ANCOVA was conducted with power (i.e., the ultimatum
game and dictator game) as repeated measures and the standard-
ized Honesty-Humility score as a covariate. Note that this analysis
keeps the standardized Honesty-Humility score as a continuous
variable.8
First, a significant main effect of power revealed that people
were more exploitative in the dictator game (M = 54.89;
SD = 14.57, 95% CI [52.91, 56.87]) than in the ultimatum game
(M = 51.65; SD = 9.97, 95% CI [50.30, 53.00]), F(1, 207) = 10.08,
p = .002, gp2 = 0.05. People with power offered about 6% fewer
resources to others than people who had shared power. Such dif-
ferences may be small for a single interaction, however, across a
longer time span (i.e., repeated interactions) such differences
may add up. Furthermore, a main effect of standardized Honesty-
Humility was obtained, F(1, 207) = 15.35, b = 2.62, 95% CI
[3.94, 1.30], p < .001, gp2 = 0.07. Finally, the predicted interaction
between standardized Honesty-Humility and power was obtained,
F(1, 207) = 6.73, p = .010, gp2 = 0.03.9
Fig. 1 displays the simple slopes analysis of the interaction
effect of power and standardized Honesty-Humility. As predicted,
standardized Honesty-Humility significantly predicted exploita-
tion in the dictator game (b = 3.95, 95% CI [5.87, 2.03],
p < .001), specifically, people low in Honesty-Humility acted more
exploitative in the dictator game than those high in Honesty-
Humility. However, standardized Honesty-Humility did not signif-Note that a repeated measures ANCOVA with the standardized Honesty-Humility
score results in exactly the same findings as the procedure described in a regression
framework for moderation with repeated measures data (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland,
2001). We have used the approach by Judd et al. to estimate the b-values reported in
the text. Furthermore, we prefer to report the standardized Honesty-Humility score to
the centered Honesty-Humility score because this allows for a more meaningful
interpretation of the b-values.
9 To check the robustness of these results (and those of Study 2) we also analyzed
the data with the inclusion of demographic variables and the other five HEXACO traits
in the model. The focal results of Study 1 and Study 2 were virtually unchanged by the
inclusions of the these additional variables to the model (see the supplementary files
for details). The main difference was that in Study 2 the contrast between exploitation
in the delta game and in the ultimatum game was no longer significant.
Table 1
Correlations between the Variables included in Study 1 and the Choices in the Economic games.
Variable a M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Gender – 0.28 0.45 –
2. Age – 24.53 11.42 0.17* –
3. H 0.81 3.54 0.51 0.30** 0.09 –
4. E 0.85 3.25 0.58 0.43** 0.18** 0.18** –
5. X 0.84 3.54 0.51 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.17* –
6. A 0.86 3.03 0.58 0.05 0.04 0.25** 0.13 0.22** –
7. C 0.84 3.47 0.54 0.00 0.14* 0.19** 0.06 0.04 0.01 –
8. O 0.83 3.21 0.60 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.02 –
9. Percentage of money kept in the dictator game – 54.89 14.57 0.09 0.10 0.27** 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03
10. Percentage of money kept in the ultimatum game – 51.65 9.97 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.30**
Note. * = p < .05, **p < .01, for gender F = 0 and M = 1. Higher values in the economic games reflect more exploitative behavior.
Fig. 1. Simple slopes analysis for interaction between Honesty-Humility (with values 1 SD above and below the mean; and the 95% confidence interval) and power. The y-axis
limits are set at one standard deviation above and below the mean of amount kept in the dictator game.
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CI [2.64, 0.07], p = .063).
2.3. Discussion
In Study 1 we investigated the extent to which exploitative
behaviors of allocators was affected by their Honesty-Humility in
the ultimatum game and the dictator game. Honesty-Humility
was significantly related to exploitation only in the dictator game
and not in the ultimatum game. These findings replicate Hilbig
and Zettler (2009) and suggest that the level of allocator power
affects the expression of Honesty-Humility. However, the two
games used in this study reflect two extremes of the power contin-
uum (Suleiman, 1996). Therefore, we wanted to follow-up on thisresearch by investigating the impact of intermediate levels of allo-
cator power on the effect of Honesty-Humility on exploitative
behavior. Furthermore, although the differences between these
games have been interpreted in terms of power asymmetry it
has not yet been adequately investigated whether people actually
perceive these power differences and feel powerful in these games.
Specifically, a prior study only evaluated the ultimatum and dicta-
tor games with an ad-hoc scale with unknown psychometric prop-
erties (Sivanathan et al., 2008). Moreover, we also wanted to
investigate whether the delta game indeed resulted in an interme-
diate level of perceived and felt power and would also result in an
‘intermediate’ interaction with Honesty-Humility (predicted by the
STOA model; De Vries et al., 2016) or a stronger interaction effect
than the high power situation (predicted by the TASS model;
11
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come activation prediction of the power-exploitation affordances
hypothesis by determining whether individuals low in Honesty-
Humility benefited more financially from higher levels of power
than individuals high in Honesty-Humility.
3. Pilot study
Our aim of the pilot study was to manipulate power using eco-
nomic games by contrasting the dictator game, ultimatum game,
and the delta game. This pilot study was conducted to investigate
whether it was appropriate to use economic games as a manipula-
tion of power by assessing the perceptions of these games using
the power subscale of the situational interdependence scale (SIS;
Gerpott et al., 2018). We conducted an a-priori power analysis
based on the main effect of power from Study 1 to determine our
sample size (required gp2 = 0.04; a = 0.05; b = 0.80; correlation
among repeated measures, r = 0.25).10 Note that no prior study
had compared the perceptions of power in these games with the
SIS, therefore, we chose the results from Study 1 because we
expected that behavior in these games would reasonably be related
to perceptions of power. This power analysis indicated that we
required a sample of 60 respondents to achieve this effect. Therefore,
we recruited a sample of 60 first year psychology students
(Mage = 19.68 years; SDage = 2.23; 52 women) who participated in
return for course credit.
The participants evaluated each game on the perceived power
asymmetry between the allocator and recipient with the power
subscale of the SIS (Gerpott et al., 2018). Furthermore, the partici-
pants indicated the level of felt power in the allocator role (Rucker,
Dubois, & Galinsky, 2011). The results of this pilot confirmed that
these economic games (i.e., dictator game, delta game, and ultima-
tum game) are appropriate manipulations of power because they
resulted in the expected significant differences in perceived (F(2,
118) = 70.25; p < .001, gp2 = 0.54) and felt power (F(2, 118)
= 68.11; p < .001, gp2 = 0.54). Briefly, the planned comparisons
revealed that all these games significantly differed in terms of per-
ceived and felt power. Specifically, the dictator game had the high-
est perceived (M = 4.72; SD = 0.61, 95% CI [4.56, 4.87]) and felt
power (M = 6.20; SD = 1.22, 95% CI [5.89, 6.52]), the delta game
was intermediate in perceived (M = 3.46; SD = 0.95, 95% CI [3.22,
3.71]) and felt power (M = 4.35; SD = 1.34, 95% CI [4.00, 4.70]),
and the ultimatum game was lowest in perceived (M = 3.01;
SD = 1.02, 95% CI [2.74, 3.27]) and felt power (M = 3.93; SD = 1.21,
95% CI [3.62, 4.25]; See the supplementary materials for further
details). Overall, the results of the pilot indicated that the three
games can be used as manipulations of allocator power.
4. Study 2
In Study 2, we tested the interaction between Honesty-Humility
and power using incentivized multi-player behavioral economic
games. The first goal of this experiment was to replicate the main
finding of Study 1 that individual differences in Honesty-Humility
were only related to exploitative behavior in absolute power situ-
ations but not in shared power situations. However, we now also
added the delta game as an intermediate power situation to find
out whether this yielded an ‘intermediate’ interaction effect, as
predicted by the STOA model (De Vries et al., 2016), or an even
stronger interaction effect than the high power situation, as pre-
dicted by the TASS model (Marshall & Brown, 2006). We based10 Note that we used the used the standard settings of G*Power (options: effect size
specification as in GPower 3.0) instead of the option ‘‘as in SPSS”. If we had used the
‘‘as in SPSS” setting an a-priori sample size of 119 participants was required to detect
this effect size. Therefore, our pilot sample may have been somewhat underpowered.our design upon the results of the pilot study that demonstrated
that it was appropriate to use the ultimatum game, delta game,
and dictator as manipulations of power.
To make the power manipulation consequential we further
improved upon the design of Study 1 in several ways. First, we
incentivized the outcomes of the games in order to reduce any
potential response biases (e.g., socially desirable responding), mak-
ing the exploitation of other persons more attractive than in games
with hypothetical outcomes. Furthermore, the incentivized nature
of this study allowed us to also investigate whether individuals low
in Honesty-Humility actually benefit from having power by earn-
ing more resources than those who are higher in Honesty-
Humility. Another improvement was to include multiple assess-
ments of every game so that we were able to determine the alpha
reliability of each game.4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants and procedure
Study 2 was conducted in two phases using AmazonMechanical
Turk (MTurk). In the first phase, 450 American MTurk workers
were recruited (222 women; Mage = 34.92 years; SDage = 10.99)
who completed the English HEXACO-100 (Lee & Ashton, 2018)
and indicated their availability for the online interaction experi-
ment. All workers who completed the first phase of the experiment
were paid $0.50. The responses were screened for noncompliant
responses (See the Materials Section). Those who passed the
screening were invited to participate in the interaction experiment
that started one week after the first phase. For this interaction
phase we a-priori determined to recruit 160 participants based
on the results of a power analysis (we used the same power calcu-
lation as reported for Study 1, r = 0.20, a = 0.05; b = 0.80, one-sided
test, required n = 150 plus some oversampling).11 During the sec-
ond phase, 160 MTurk workers completed the interaction experi-
ment. The data of two participants were discarded based on the
criteria for noncompliant response patterns (Barends & De Vries,
2019; Lee & Ashton, 2018). The final sample consisted of 158 individ-
uals (80 women; Mage = 36.70 years; SDage = 11.46). Participants
received a flat fee of $1.- for the interaction experiment and could
earn a bonus payment up to $3.- based on their decisions in the
experiment.
Starting from one week after the personality inventory data was
collected, eligible workers were informed when a timeslot for the
study was published on the MTurk website. The interaction pro-
ceeded using the Software Platform for Human Interaction Exper-
iments (SoPHIE; Hendriks, 2012). SoPHIE is an online software
platform for designing and conducting real-time interaction exper-
iments, and several studies have successfully used SoPHIE for real-
time economic game experiments (e.g., Hauser, Hendriks, Rand, &
Nowak, 2016; Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016). Earlier research
demonstrated that online interaction experiments studies resulted
in comparable findings as those obtained in the lab (Arechar,
Gächter, & Molleman, 2017) and that the data quality of MTurk
samples is similar to high-quality commercial online samples
(Thomas & Clifford, 2017).
The participants completed the different games in groups of
eight. The order of the games was altered between sessions. In ses-
sions containing fewer than eight participants, the first author
would take over the remaining slots. Similarly, when participantsAs already noted in footnote 3, G*Power only allows for the calculation of a
repeated measures ANOVA (not a repeated measures ANCOVA). However, if we
conducted an a-priori power analysis using a repeated measures ANOVA with two
groups (instead of a covariate), three within subject measurements (levels of power),
and the expected effect size of gp2 = 0.04, a sample size of 120 participants was
required to detect an interaction effect with a = 0.05 and b = 0.80.
Table 2
Correlations between the HEXACO Traits, the Offers and Earnings in Each of the Economic Games in Study 2.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Gender .49 .50 –
2. Age 36.70 11.46 .12 
3. H 3.59 .70 .19* .15 .87
4. E 3.14 .70 .46** .05 .08 .87
5. X 3.13 .81 .01 .03 .03 .17* .93
6. A 3.16 .74 .02 .12 .39** .20* .34** .92
7. C 3.84 .60 .16* .04 .20* .12 .37** .15 .89
8. O 3.59 .63 .08 .02 .01 .01 .31** .22* .17* .85
9. Percentage of money kept/earned in the
dictator game
66.43 19.03 .23* .11 .25** .09 .16* .01 .03 .07 .87
10. Percentage of money kept in the delta game 57.76 12.15 .01 .10 .06 .00 .14 .02 .07 .10 .39** .87
11. Percentage of money kept in the ultimatum
game
56.59 11.53 .09 .13 .03 .03 .12 .02 .02 .17* .29** .81** .90
12. Percentage of money earned as the allocator
in the delta game
53.28 6.37 .10 .03 .05 .04 .00 .00 .07 .08 .26** .52** .26** 
13. Percentage of money earned as the allocator
in the ultimatum game
50.73 16.62 .07 .06 .02 .10 .07 .07 .05 .03 .08 .40** .52** .30*
Note. For gender F = 0 and M = 1, a are visible on the diagonal, *p < .05, **p < .01.
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over by the first author. Note that the choices made by the first
author only affected the recipient decisions of the actual partici-
pants because only after all allocator decisions were made partici-
pants were confronted with the offers of the other participants.
Empty roles were taken over so that the experiment could be com-
pleted, and so that all participants could be paid based on their
decisions.12 Dropouts were only observed before the actual alloca-
tion decisions took place, so no partial data was collected.4.1.2. Materials
4.1.2.1. HEXACO-100. The English version of the HEXACO-100
(Lee & Ashton, 2018) used the same items as the Dutch version
used for Study 1. However, for this study the Altruism items were
not included, and to check for noncompliant responses four atten-
tional check items from the Personality Research Form were inter-
spersed in the HEXACO-100 (Fekken, Holden, Jackson, & Guthrie,
1987). Based on these attention checks 48 participants from phase
1 (10.67% of the sample) were not invited for phase 2. These 48
participants had unusable data indicated by their low a reliabilities
(all below 0.30) (see Barends & De Vries, 2019 for an in-depth
demonstration that removing such noncompliant respondents
removes noise from the dataset). The sample that completed the
interaction experiment had scale a reliabilities above 0.84 on all
HEXACO traits.4.1.2.2. Interaction experiment. At the beginning of the experiment,
all three games were explained using examples to clarify the differ-
ences between the three games. The structure of the dictator and
ultimatum game was the same as in Study 1 and again they were
described as tasks instead of games. The delta game is a modified
version of the ultimatum game (Suleiman, 1996), in which if a
recipient rejects the offer, the recipient receives half of what was
offered to him/her, and the allocator receives half of what he/she
wanted to keep. Participants first made all allocator decisions
and then made all recipient decisions. At the start of the experi-
ment, participants were informed that their bonus would be one
randomly selected trial of their allocator decisions and one ran-
domly selected trial of their recipient decisions.12 If roles were taken over, the first author would always offer an equal split. In the
recipient role of the delta and ultimatum game only offers equal to or greater than an
equal split were accepted. Participants were not informed that empty roles were
taken over by the first experimenter.The interaction experiment started with the allocator phase, in
which all participants made their allocator decisions. The players
were divided into a group of four A players and a group of four B
players; this role was not communicated to the participants and
was only used to match players during the interaction. Each game
was played four times with a new recipient for each round (always
matching A players in the allocator roles to B players in the recip-
ient roles, and at the same time matching B players in the allocator
roles to A players in the recipient roles). Per round the amount of
resources to be divided differed, and were presented in a fixed
order (i.e., 105, 60, 15, or 150 points). Each point was worth
$0.01. The order of the three economic games was changed
between sessions, yielding six different orders. For the analyses,
all offers were computed in percentages and the mean percentage
was taken as the outcome variable for each type of game (i.e., the
operationalisations of power). As in Study 1, the amount the allo-
cator did not choose to offer to the recipient was taken as a mea-
sure of exploitative behavior. Note that the offers were analyzed
without taking into account the rejection and acceptation deci-
sions by the recipients. Only when analyzing the actual earnings
were the rejections and acceptations taken into account. To be
clear, in the dictator game the offers and earnings did not differ
because the recipient could not reject the offer.
After all participants made the allocator decisions, they pro-
gressed to the recipient phase of the experiment, in which they
made the recipient decisions. In this phase, each participant was
presented the offer of a matched player. In the ultimatum game
and the delta game the participants chose whether to accept or
reject the offer. When making these recipient decisions the partic-
ipants were always informed how much they and the allocator
would earn if they accepted the offer and how much each of them
would earn if they rejected the offer. Only after the participant
accepted or rejected an offer could they progress to the next offer.
In the dictator game participants learned how much they received
from the allocators. All recipient decisions were made in the same
order as in the allocator phase.4.2. Results
4.2.1. Generalizability of the sample
It was important to check whether our sample in the interaction
experiment (phase 2) was generalizable to the full sample who
were invited but did not end up participating. Potentially, people
with certain personality profiles (e.g., people lower in Honesty-
Humility) may have self-selected into the interaction experiment.
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the six HEXACO traits differed between these two groups. We did
not find any significant differences between the two groups (See
Table S6) and therefore conclude that our sample of interaction
participants is representative of the full sample.4.2.2. Offers
To determine whether it was acceptable to aggregate the differ-
ent trials of each game, the a reliabilities were determined for the
four trials per game. The a reliabilities were 0.90 for the ultimatum
game, 0.87 for the delta game, and 0.87 for the dictator game (see
Table 2), replicating earlier studies reporting similar values for
choices in the dictator game (Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt,
2014; Brocklebank, Lewis, & Bates, 2011). Our findings suggest that
the a reliabilities for four dictator game allocator trials are similar
to the reliabilities of the allocator decisions in four trials of the ulti-
matum game and of four trials in the delta game. For each type of
game (i.e., for each level of power), we calculated the mean per-
centage of kept resources.
Zero order correlations were calculated between the demo-
graphics, the HEXACO traits, and the behavior in the different
games. As shown in Table 2, Honesty-Humility was related to
exploitation only in the dictator game (r = 0.25, p = .001). This
finding is consistent with the results from Study 1. Honesty-
Humility was not significantly correlated to exploitation in the
delta game (r = 0.06, p = .476), nor was it in the ultimatum game
(r = 0.03, p = .748).
In order to exclude the possibility that the order of games influ-
enced any of the allocation decisions, we analyzed the contribu-
tions in a mixed ANOVA with power (i.e., the offers for each of
the three economic games) as the within factor (three levels) and
the order of games as the between subject factors (six different
orders).
The results do not suggest that the order of the games influ-
enced the allocations because no differences were obtained for
the order, F(5, 152) = 0.31, p = .904, gp2 = 0.01; nor was an interac-
tion effect obtained between power and the order, F(6.19,
188.11) = 1.18, p = .317, gp2 = 0.04 (Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rected).13 The order of the games was therefore omitted from all
subsequent analyses.14
To test the power-exploitation hypothesis, a repeated measures
ANCOVA with power as the within factor and the standardized
Honesty-Humility score as a (continuous) covariate was con-
ducted. First, a main effect was obtained, replicating the outcomes
of the pilot study (see Supplemental materials) that the amount of
offered resources differed between the three games, F(1.25,
194.94) = 38.15, p < .001, gp2 = 0.20 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected).
The planned comparisons revealed that the amount kept in the dic-
tator game was higher (M = 66.43%, SD = 19.03, 95% CI [63.46,
69.40]) than the amount kept in the delta game (M = 57.76%,
SD = 12.15, 95% CI [55.87, 59.65]; F(1, 156) = 37.91; p < .001,
gp2 = 0.20). Similarly, the amount kept in the delta game was signif-
icantly higher than in the ultimatum game (M = 56.59%, SD = 11.53,
95% CI [54.79, 58.39]; F(1, 156) = 3.95; p = .049, gp2 = 0.03). Finally,
the amount kept in the dictator game was also significantly higher13 Multi-trial games that do not incentivize all trials are often analyzed in this way
(e.g., Blanco, Engelmann, & Normann, 2011; Gillet, Cartwright, & Van Vugt, 2011).
Note that when we only analyzed the data of the allocator trial that was actually paid
then we do not find the proposed interaction effect. The reason is that this changes
the design from a within subjects to a between subjects design, thereby losing
statistical power.
14 If include the order of the games as an additional robustness check in the model
with all six HEXACO traits, gender, and age in the repeated measures ANCOVA then
the relation between Honesty-Humility in the dictator game and in the delta game
are no longer significantly different. The contrast between the dictator game and the
ultimatum game still remains significant.than the amount kept in the ultimatum game, F(1, 156) = 43.75;
p < .001, gp2 = 0.22.
Furthermore, a main effect of standardized Honesty-Humility
was obtained F(1, 156) = 4.54, p = .035, gp2 = 0.03. To interpret this
main effect all allocations across the games were aggregated and
included in a regression analysis with the standardized Honesty-
Humility trait, this regression indicated that those higher in the
trait were less exploitative across the games, b = 1.92, 95% CI
[3.71, 0.14], p = .035.
As expected, an interaction between power and Honesty-
Humility was observed, F(1.25, 194.94) = 8.08, p = .003, gp2 = 0.05
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). The planned contrasts revealed
that the relation between Honesty-Humility and exploitation in
the dictator game was significantly different from the relation
between Honesty-Humility and exploitation in the delta game, F
(1, 156) = 8.37, p = .004, gp2 = 0.05. The relations between
Honesty-Humility and exploitation in the delta game and between
Honesty-Humility and exploitation in the ultimatum game did not
differ significantly, F(1, 156) = 0.45, p = .503, gp2 = 0.00. Finally, the
relations between Honesty-Humility and exploitation in the dicta-
tor game and ultimatum game were also significantly different, F
(1, 156) = 9.02, p = .003, gp2 = 0.06. Fig. 2 visualizes the interaction
between power and Honesty-Humility. As can be observed, stan-
dardized Honesty-Humility predicted exploitation in the dictator
game (b = 4.78, 95% CI [7.70, 1.87], p = .001) indicating that
those low in Honesty-Humility were more exploitative than those
high in Honesty-Humility. Comparatively, exploitation in the delta
game was not significantly related to Honesty-Humility (b = 0.70,
95% CI [2.61, 1.22], p = .476) and neither was it in the ultimatum
game (b = 0.30, 95% CI [2.12, 1.53], p = .748).
4.2.3. Earnings
According to the outcome activation hypothesis, allocators low
on Honesty-Humility should obtain better outcomes for them-
selves in positions of power than allocators high on Honesty-
Humility. To test this prediction, we analyzed the data as if all trials
would have been incentivized.15 However, we first adjusted the
earnings for the trials in which empty roles were filled by the first
author because, as noted in the method section, offers lower than
the equal split were always rejected. In total 29 participants rejected
at least one offer in the ultimatum game and 39 participants rejected
at least one offer in the delta game, however, the participants in this
study had a different threshold for rejecting offers: The mean value
of the offers that were rejected in the ultimatum was 18.71%
(SD = 16.93, 95% CI [12.55, 24.87]) and in the delta game it was
16.50% (SD = 13.88, 95% CI [12.14, 20.86]). These two values were
significantly lower than 50%: In the ultimatum game the mean dif-
ference of 31.29% was significantly lower than 50%, t(28) = 9.95,
p < .001, d = 1.85; In the delta game the mean difference of
33.50% was also significantly lower than 50%, t(38) = 15.07,
p < .001, d = 2.41.16 We thus adjusted the rejections of taken over
roles by retroactively only rejecting the offers equal to or lower than
the respective mean rejection value per trial. To calculate the earn-
ings we used the same approach as for the offers and report the
amount earned in percentages.
Table 2 shows that only Honesty-Humility was significantly
related to the earnings in the dictator game (r = 0.25, p = .001),15 All within subject results in Study 2 are reported using Greenhouse Geisser
corrections because the assumption of sphericity was violated for the assessment of
power. Specifically, in the analysis of the offers, the Mauchly’s test was significant:
v2(2) = 144.57, p <.001. Similarly, in the analysis of the earnings, the Mauchly’s test
was also significant: v2(2) = 88.19, p <.001.
16 We tested whether the number of rejections was related to power or to any of the
HEXACO traits. The number of rejections did not differ between the two games (based
on all data), t(157) = 1.30, p = .195. Additionally, none of the personality traits were
significantly correlated to the number of rejections (all r0s < 0.13)
Fig. 2. Simple slopes analysis for interaction between Honesty-Humility (with values one standard deviation above and below the mean; and the 95% confidence interval)
and power for the amount kept in Study 2 The y-axis limits are set at one standard deviation above the mean of the dictator game and at one standard deviation below the
mean of the ultimatum game.
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between the offers and the earnings. In the other two games the
earnings were not significantly correlated to Honesty-Humility
(in the delta game, r = 0.05, p = .566; in the ultimatum game,
r = 0.06, p = .474).
In order to investigate the power-affordances hypothesis for the
outcomes we again conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA with
power as the within subject factor and the standardized Honesty-
Humility score as a (continuous) covariate.
The results revealed a main effect of power, F(1.40, 217.59)
= 76.60, p < .001, gp2 = 0.33 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). The
planned comparisons revealed that participants earned the most
money in the dictator game (M = 66.43% of the total resources;
SD = 19.03, 95% CI [63.46, 69.40]). Specifically, the amount earned
in the dictator game was significantly more than the amount
earned in the delta game (M = 45.20% of the total resources;
SD = 6.67, 95% CI [44.16, 46.24]), F(1, 156) = 87.92, p < .001,
gp2 = 0.36. Similarly, the earnings in the dictator game were also sig-
nificantly higher than those in the ultimatum game (M = 45.21% of
the total resources; SD = 7.34, 95% CI [44.07, 46.35]), F(1, 156)
= 76.60, p < .001, gp2 = 0.33. Additionally, the earnings in the delta
game were higher than those in the ultimatum game, F(1, 156)
= 16.72, p < .001, gp2 = 0.10. Moreover, the main effect of Honesty-
Humility (aggregated across all levels of power) was non-
significant, F(1, 156) = 3.52, b = 1.25, 95% CI [2.57, 0.07],
p = .063, gp2 = 0.02.
More importantly, an interaction between power and Honesty-
Humility was obtained, F(1.40, 217.59) = 8.87, p = .001, gp2 = 0.05
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). The planned contrasts revealedthat the relation between Honesty-Humility and earnings in the
dictator gamewas significantly different from the relation between
Honesty-Humility and earnings in the delta game, F(1, 156)
= 12.79, p < .001, gp2 = 0.08. The relations between Honesty-
Humility and earnings in the delta game and between Honesty-
Humility and earnings in the ultimatum game did not differ signif-
icantly, F(1, 156) = 0.18, p = .675, gp2 = 0.00. Finally, the relations
between Honesty-Humility and earnings in the dictator game
and ultimatum game were also significantly different, F(1, 156)
= 8.98, p = .003, gp2 = 0.05. Fig. 3 shows the simple slopes analysis
of this interaction effect and indicates that people low in
Honesty-Humility earned about 10% more than those high in
Honesty-Humility in the dictator game, whereas these people did
not earn more than others in the delta game or in the ultimatum
game. The simple slopes of the relation between Honesty-
Humility and earnings in dictator game is the same as the one
reported for the offers (b = 4.78, 95% CI [7.70, 1.87],
p = .001). The simple slopes of relation between Honesty-
Humility and delta game was non-significant (b = 0.31, 95% CI
[0.74, 1.35], p = .566); and neither was the simple slopes of the
relation between Honesty-Humility and earnings in the ultimatum
game (b = 0.72, 95% CI [1.26, 2.69], p = .474).
4.3. Discussion
In the Study 2 exploitative behavior of allocators was investi-
gated by looking at the effect of Honesty-Humility in three eco-
nomic games that differed in their power asymmetry (the delta
game, ultimatum game, and dictator game). If an allocator had
Fig. 3. Simple slopes analysis for interaction between Honesty-Humility (with values one standard deviation above and below the mean; and the 95% confidence interval)
and power for the amount earned in Study 2 The y-axis limits are set at one standard deviation above the mean of the dictator game and at one standard deviation below the
mean of the ultimatum game.
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dicted to what extent someone exploited others for personal gain.
Whereas if the power of allocators was intermediate or shared,
there was no difference in exploitative behavior between people
low and high in Honesty-Humility. Moreover, because individuals
low in Honesty-Humility adequately inhibited their exploitative
tendencies in the intermediate and shared power conditions (i.e.,
delta and ultimatum games), they obtained the best overall out-
comes in the experiment.5. General discussion
We hypothesized that personality differences in Honesty-
Humility would moderate the effects of power asymmetry on
exploitation by allocators. Following the power-exploitation affor-
dances hypothesis, we expected high power to affect both trait
activation—the extent to which an exploitation situation afforded
the expression of individual differences in Honesty-Humility—
and outcome activation—the extent to which the expression of
Honesty-Humility predicts different outcomes. We conducted
two studies whereby we used different games to simulate power
asymmetries: the dictator game, delta game, and ultimatum game.
The combined results of our studies suggest that trait and outcome
activation of Honesty-Humility especially occur in high power sit-
uations and to lesser extent—or not at all—in intermediate and
shared power situations.
In Studies 1 and 2 we found that Honesty-Humility was nega-
tively associated with exploitation when allocators had absolutepower (dictator) but not when power was intermediate (delta) or
shared (ultimatum). This finding supports the idea that exploita-
tion situations afford the expression of Honesty-Humility when
there are no constraints in place (e.g., countervailing powers,
checks, and balances) to inhibit this expression (De Vries et al.,
2016; Tett & Burnett, 2003). Power likely frees individuals from
such constraints and thus a situation of absolute power may be
considered a weak situation (Galinsky et al., 2008) because of the
absence of potential punishment or retaliation. However, our find-
ing does not support the idea of an ‘intermediate’ interaction effect
in the intermediate power condition and also contrasts with the
prediction from the TASS model that in intermediate power situa-
tions the greatest difference between low and high Honesty-
Humility would be found (Marshall & Brown, 2006).
In Study 2 we conducted a fully incentivized online multi-
player interaction experiment to replicate the first study and also
consider the impact on the earnings of the allocators. We found
that allocators low in Honesty-Humility earned the most money
during the games—a finding indicating that this group of individu-
als benefitted the most from having power. Importantly, this was
only true in the dictator game where they had absolute power over
others and not in the games where they had intermediate or
shared power levels.5.1. Comparing findings across studies
The findings of our studies also allow us to disentangle the con-
tradicting findings of three earlier studies on the interaction
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Recall that Bendahan et al. (2015) found only evidence for a main
effect of power and that DeCelles et al. (2012) and Hilbig and
Zettler (2009) found an interaction between power and individual
dispositions (i.e., moral identity and Honesty-Humility respec-
tively). Our results corroborate those of DeCelles et al. (2012)
and Hilbig and Zettler (2009) but contradict those of Bendahan
et al. (2015). Our findings are comparable to those of DeCelles
et al. (2012) and Hilbig and Zettler (2009) in that power and
Honesty-Humility interacted in predicting exploitative behavior.
It is notable that we found similar results despite the fact that
the external power manipulation used by DeCelles et al. (2012)
has been criticized for not providing insight in real power asymme-
try (e.g., Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). We only observed this interac-
tion effect in the absolute power situations (i.e., in the dictator
games); it was absent in the intermediate and shared power situ-
ations (i.e., in the delta and ultimatum games).
Our findings contrast with the results of Bendahan et al. (2015),
who only found evidence for a main effect of power and not for an
interaction effect between power and Honesty-Humility. A possi-
ble explanation for this contrast is in the component of power that
was manipulated. Bendahan et al. (2015) only compared differ-
ences in absolute power by contrasting different versions of a dic-
tator game. However, earlier research has demonstrated that
power consists of both influence and autonomy (Lammers,
Stoker, Rink, & Galinsky, 2016). Influence reflects to what extent
one controls the resources of another individual, whereas auton-
omy reflects to what extent one is free from the influence of
another person. Bendahan et al. (2015) compared differences in
absolute power (i.e., the effects of adding more response options
and increasing the number of people affected by the dictator’s
behavior) and thus seem to have manipulated influence while
keeping autonomy constantly high. On the other hand, we con-
trasted the effects of absolute power with intermediate and shared
power (i.e., the difference between the dictator game, the delta
game, and the ultimatum game) which could be considered a
manipulation of autonomy. Potentially, compared to differences
in influence, differences in autonomy may be more closely aligned
to variations in situational strength. We believe that our manipula-
tion is more informative for understanding what having power
does to a person because our manipulation of resource control
more closely aligns with the definition of power: having asymmet-
ric control over valued resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
Moreover, our results suggest that the findings of Hilbig and
Zettler (2009) may be mainly due to the manipulation of allocator
power. Specifically, our pilot study indicated people perceived dif-
ferent levels of power for the dictator game and ultimatum game
(and also the delta game). Furthermore, we improved upon the
study of Hilbig and Zettler in several ways. First, we added the
delta game and demonstrated that the interaction between
Honesty-Humility and power arises in when an allocator has abso-
lute power but not when the allocator has intermediate or shared
power. Second, by using multiple instances of every game we were
able to determine the reliability of each assessment of the behavior
in each game. Third, Hilbig and Zettler (2009) used hypothetical
games, however, we demonstrated that interactions between
Honesty-Humility and power also arise in an incentivized multi-
player interaction experiment. Therefore, these findings cannot
be attributed to demand effects or other response biases (cf. Ben-
Ner, Kramer, & Levy, 2008). Fourth, we show that low Honesty-
Humility has real consequences in terms of higher outcomes
retained. This aligns with findings of Babiak, Neumann, and Hare
(2010) that people high in psychopathy (e.g., low on Honesty-
Humility, see De Vries, Ashton, & Lee, 2008; Lee & Ashton, 2014)
have a higher proportionate representation in the boardroom of
large firms than in the population at large.5.2. Limitations of our studies
One of the limitations of our studies is that we did not assess
people’s familiarity with economic games. We know from previous
research that such prior experience may influence people’s
decision-making strategies (Cooper & Dutcher, 2011). This concern
applies particularly to the MTurk sample we used in Study 2
(Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). To assess this possibility
we looked at how comparable individual’s decisions in the games
were to previous studies that used the same games. Our findings
were quite consistent with meta-analytic findings showing that
people offered on average around 30% of their endowment in the
dictator game (Engel, 2011) and around 40% in the ultimatum
game (Oosterbeek, Sloof, & Van De Kuilen, 2004). Additionally,
our results are also comparable to a study done on participants
without any experience with economic games (Zhao et al., 2017).
A second limitation of our studies is that we only examined how
situational power affects exploitation in monetary decisions. Yet
exploitation of others can also involve telling lies, denying promo-
tions or excluding low power individuals from relevant informa-
tion (Anderson & Brion, 2014; Köbis, Van Prooijen, Righetti, &
Van Lange, 2016; Lasthuizen, Huberts, & Heres, 2011). Thus, it
remains an open question whether our findings will generalize to
a broader set of exploitative behaviors that organizations face
when they have low Honesty-Humility people in powerful
positions.
Finally, we compared the prediction from the STOA (De Vries
et al., 2016) with that of the TASS model (Marshall & Brown,
2006) in a post-hoc manner (see footnote 2). It should be noted
that the TASS-model was developed in the context of biological
traits and it may not necessarily apply to traits like honesty or sin-
cerity. Future research may want to test contrasting predictions
from the STOA and TASS models in behavioral domains that are rel-
evant to both models (e.g., emotionality/fearfulness). Second, we
did not use the TASS-model a priori to operationalize the interme-
diate activation situation for a trait. Future research might like to
include more specific operationalizations of intermediate levels
of power. We have no reason to believe that the results depend
on other characteristics of the participants, materials, or context.
5.3. Directions for future research
In testing the power-exploitation affordances hypothesis in our
studies, we did not address whether those low in Honesty-
Humility individuals are more likely to seek out situations of abso-
lute power. This is what the STOA model would predict (De Vries,
2018; De Vries et al., 2016). There is some evidence that individu-
als low in Honesty-Humility are more interested in obtaining a
high status position (Lee et al., 2013). However, it is unclear
whether they want to obtain these positions because they can
exploit others or because these positions are associated with high
status and rewards. If individuals low in Honesty-Humility are
indeed more likely to apply for—and end up in—leadership posi-
tions with absolute power this may exacerbate power abuse risks
in organizations (e.g., Padilla et al., 2007; Williams, 2014).
Future research might also like to address how power differen-
tially affects people high versus low in Honesty-Humility. A poten-
tial mediating factor may be the feelings of social distance among
those who are in positions of power. Specifically, social distance
theory predicts that situational power corrupts because powerful
individuals feel more distant from others (Magee & Smith, 2013).
Those low in Honesty-Humility perhaps feel more socially distant,
because they consider themselves worthier and entitled to greater
rewards (these self-evaluations are captured in the modesty facet
of Honesty-Humility). A different explanation is that people low
in Honesty-Humility may think they can get away more easily with
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Bathesheba syndrome (Ludwig & Longenecker, 1993). We antici-
pate that the second explanation accounts for the current findings,
because our design directly contrasted whether someone had
immunity—by having absolute power—or not. Furthermore, this
finding aligns with earlier research that individuals low in
Honesty-Humility curb their exploitation in a public goods game
when others can punish them, yet free-ride if they have impunity
(Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012). Future research might like to
contrast both potential mediators to determine why power influ-
ences people with low Honesty-Humility.5.4. Conclusion
To conclude, our studies show that individuals who are disposi-
tionally low in Honesty-Humility are more likely to exploit situa-
tions of high power by making decisions that benefit themselves
at the cost of potential gains of others. Our findings indicate that
these exploitative tendencies result in better pay-offs for them
when no appropriate checks and balances are in place to curtail
exploitative tendencies. Our findings highlight the risk of individu-
als low on Honesty-Humility getting into leadership positions with
high levels of power, because they may abuse these positions for
personal or nepotistic gains. If sharing—or restricting—power is
not an option, it may be crucial to select the right personnel for
executive level functions (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). We call therefore
for more rigorous personality assessment procedures to curb
potential exploitation by people in influential positions. Further-
more, our results highlight the importance of holding powerful
individuals accountable for their actions by avoiding structures
in which someone can gain almost absolute power over others
(cf. the Harvey Weinstein-case). That is, we echo the advice
(Pearce, Manz, & Sims, 2008) that to limit exploitation by lead-
ers—especially those low in Honesty-Humility—it is essential to
limit excessive power centralization.Acknowledgments
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